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Robert A. Hillman*
Article 29(2) of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: A New
Effort at Clarifying the Legal
Effect of "No Oral Modification"
Clauses
At first glance, article 29(2)1 of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods2 appears clear and uncon-
troversial. A party may enforce a clause barring oral modification or
termination of a contract (a "no oral modification" or "NOM" clause)
unless reliance on that party's conduct precludes enforcement. On fur-
ther reflection, however, one realizes that article 29(2) raises many diffi-
cult questions.3 This should hardly be surprising to lawyers in the
United States. The legal effect of NOM clauses in this country is
shrouded in mystery. Inadequate drafting of the pertinent sections of
the Uniform Commercial Code4 has been a major source of the confu-
sion.5 However, the Code's curious drafting is itself the result of an
underlying ambivalence about the desirability of enforcing NOM clauses
at all. This ambivalence, shared by the drafters of article 29(2),6 derives
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. I thank Stewart Schwab for his valuable
comments.
1. For the text of article 29(2), see infra text accompanying note 72.
2. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in [1980] Y.B. UNCITRAL
151, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER. A/1980, and in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG
or Convention].
3. See Part III, infra.
4. Hereinafter referred to as U.C.C. or Code.
5. See Part II, infra; Hillman, A Study Of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Con-
tract Modification Under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REV. 335 (1981) (concluding that the
U.C.C.'s approach to modifications has not been successful).
6. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its
Ninth Session, A/CN.9/142, paras. 146-147, reprinted in [1978] IV Y.B. UNCITRAL
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 449 (1988)
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from uncertainty about the extent to which parties should be able to
restrict their freedom to adjust their contracts.
Part I of this paper examines the underlying and often conflicting
forces that make NOM clauses so controversial. Part II reviews the
problematic approach of the U.C.C. Part III evaluates article 29(2) of
the Convention in light of the underlying issues and the experience of
the U.C.C. Finally, Part IV offers some suggestions for the next group
of statutory drafters attempting to decide an appropriate approach to
the problem of NOM clauses.
I. The Nature Of NOM Clauses
A no oral modification clause operates as a private statute of frauds. 7
Parties include such a clause to protect themselves from an inadvertent
or unwise oral adjustment8 and to prevent fraudulent or mistaken claims
of modification of a written agreement.9 Even if a NOM clause does not,
in fact, promote these reasonable objectives, the principle of freedom of
contract seems to suggest that parties should be free to include the pro-
vision if they believe it will serve these purposes.' 0
Recognition of NOM clauses may also promote efficiency. Accord-
ing to economic analysts of law, individuals are generally the best judges
of their own interests. 1 I Parties who agree to a NOM clause believe that
their gains in increased certainty and stability outweigh the increased
costs of contractual modifications. 12 A legal regime that does not
61.72; Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Eighth
Session, A/CN.9/128, paras. 40-42, reprinted in [1977] VIII Y.B. UNCITRAL 73, 77.
7. A typical NOM clause might state: "This contract may be modified or
rescinded only by a writing signed by both of the parties or their duly authorized
agents." Hart & Wilier, Forms and Procedures under the Uniform Commerdal Code 5 U.C.C.
Serv. (MB) § 21.07[3] (1974).
8. Professor Lon L. Fuller discussed the theoretical justifications for the statute
of frauds in his article, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941). He
argued that legal formalities, such as a writing, a seal, and consideration "act as a
check against inconsiderate action [and] induc[e] the circumspective frame of mind
appropriate in one pledging his future." Id. at 800. See also Hillman, supra note 5, at
357.
9. See, e.g., 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 1295, at 205 (2d ed. 1962). See
also, Fuller, supra note 8. Professor Fuller noted that legal formalities serve an "evi-
dentiary function" in that they provide "evidence of the existence and the purport of
the contract." Id. at 800 (quoting Austin).
10. The principle of freedom of contract is ... rooted in the notion that it is in
the public interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers to order
their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs 2-3 (1981) (Introductory Note to Chapter 8).
"Freedom of contract may be premised on the utilitarian position that everyone is the
best judge of his or her own interests or on the view that we should respect a per-
son's autonomy." Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. REV. 509, 523 (1981) (review-
ing C. FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE ). See also Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of
Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 620 (1983).
11. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1094 n.10 (1972).
12. Id. at 1113.
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enforce NOM clauses arguably conflicts with the parties' long-term
goals.
But NOM clauses have a checkered history. Courts in the United
States generally refuse to enforce them.13 Although the Uniform Com-
mercial Code purported to reverse the common law, 14 several statutory
caveats narrowly limit the use of NOM clauses.15 Even when courts con-
front cases where NOM clauses arguably apply, they sometimes engage
in elaborate gymnastics to evade their enforcement. 16 What underlies
this reluctance?
There are many problems with NOM clauses. First, they may actu-
ally impede contractual freedom rather than enhance it. One can argue
with some enthusiasm that parties should be free to change their minds
about any issue, including their agreed process of adjustment. 17 Sec-
ond, NOM clauses may be unfair. Commentators have noted that they
often "operate against the innocent and unwary," and that it would be
unjust to bar enforcement of an oral modification when a party relies on
it.' 8
NOM clauses may also conflict with prevailing commercial practices
of contract modification. Despite contrary intentions at the time of
agreement, parties often informally adjust their contracts in response to
unforeseen changes in circumstances. 19 Some commentators suggest
that NOM clauses impede such good faith agreements. 20 This criticism
may seem overly paternalistic. 2 1 Nevertheless, it reflects the thrust of
modern contract law towards facilitating actual business practices. 22
Finally, some distrust NOM clauses because they suspect that a writ-
ing does not necessarily promote the cautionary and evidentiary func-
tions traditionally associated with legal formalities.2 3 In our hurried
business world, people often sign writings without reading or contem-
plating them. In addition, wrongdoers can easily produce "expert" for-
13. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280,
1286 (7th Cir. 1986); Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co., 390 Pa. 445, 448, 136
A.2d 82, 83-84 (1957); CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1295, at 212; E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS 475 (1982).
14. U.C.C. § 2-209(2). See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
15. U.C.C. §§ 2-209(4), 2-209(5). See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. App. 1978).
17. See CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1295, at 206-08. See also Bartlett v. Stanchfield,
148 Mass. 394, 19 N.E. 549 (1889) (Justice Holmes); Beatty v. Guggenheim Explora-
tion Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 388, 122 N.E. 378, 381 (1919) (Judge Cardozo).
18. CORBIN, supra note 9, at 212. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at 475.
19. Critics of NOM clauses can point to the number of cases involving oral modi-
fications in the face of NOM clauses to support this observation. On the informality
of business dealings generally, see Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 465, 467, and his other works cited therein.
20. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 9, at 212.
21. "We will not enforce your NOM clause because we know you will change your
mind and seek to make an oral adjustment later." See generally Kronman, Paternalism
and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763 (1983).
22. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102.
23. See Fuller, supra notes 8 and 9.
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geries.24 Indeed, a NOM clause may even promote fraud by
encouraging a party wrongfully to deny the existence of an oral agree-
ment to adjust a contract term.2 5
Unfortunately, the NOM clause debate is inconclusive. Arguments
appealing to freedom and fairness are inherently controversial. Philoso-
phers and legal scholars have long wrestled with the question of what
constitutes individual and contractual freedom, inquiries that raise
issues closely paralleling those posed by a NOM clause. 26 In addition,
the unfairness of ignoring a party's reliance on an oral modification
depends on whether the reliance was reasonable and foreseeable to the
other party. Such issues intersect with the threshold questions of the
nature and validity of NOM clauses. 2 7
The NOM clause debate is also inconclusive because we simply do
not know whether business would benefit more from facilitating or
deterring oral modifications of written agreements when the parties
originally intended to bar such adjustments. The answer to this ques-
tion depends on comparing the frequency and costs of parties mistak-
enly thinking a NOM clause benefits them with the frequency and
benefits of parties correctly including a NOM clause.2 8 This question,
therefore, awaits empirical investigation. Similarly, the question of
whether a statute of frauds actually decreases fraud and appropriately
cautions parties is also highly debatable and ultimately empirical. 29 In
light of the inconclusiveness of the philosophical debate and the dearth
of empirical evidence, it is hardly surprising that lawmakers are ambiva-
lent about NOM clauses.
As a result of this conceptual morass, lawmakers have tended to
adopt intermediate positions. The compromise adopted by the drafters
of the CISG is to enforce a NOM clause only when a party contesting the
clause has not relied on an oral modification or other conduct.3 0 The
problem with compromise positions, however, is that they may create
confusion, even rendering the law ineffective. This accurately portrays
the U.C.C.'s experience. It may be an accurate forecast of the future
under the CISG.
24. See, e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 72 (2d ed. 1980); Hillman, supra note 5, at 368.
25. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 72-74.
26. See, e.g.,J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 36-111 (1984) ("[Blinding oneself
is a privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness of will; the main technique
for achieving rationality by indirect means." Id. at 37.); Kronman, supra note 21, at
764 (law invalidating certain terms "protect[s] the promisor... by limiting his power
to do what the law judges to be against his own interests .... ).
27. Is it reasonable to rely on an oral modification when the parties' agreed that
such an adjustment would be unenforceable? Is such reliance foreseeable? On the
problem of circularity in reliance jurisprudence, see, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 274-276 (1986).
28. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
29. Cf supra notes 8-9.
30. See infra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
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H. A Brief Look At NOM Clauses Under The Uniform
Commercial Code
As noted earlier,3 1 courts in the United States generally refuse to
enforce NOM clauses. 32 The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code,
however, resurrected them in Section 2-209(2). 33
The Code included Section 2-209(2) as part of a larger effort to
expunge outdated common-law doctrines which impede good faith
modifications. 34 A major element of this revision was abolition of the
much criticized common-law requirement of consideration to enforce a
modification. 3 5 Some believe, however, that consideration cautions the
parties and provides evidence of their transaction. 36 Eliminating the
doctrine of consideration from contract modifications also removed
these safeguards, and Section 2-209(2) was included to allow parties to
protect themselves by establishing their own statute of frauds.
3 7
Section 2-209(4), however, clouds the analysis. 38 According to the
section, if parties include a NOM clause, but later "attempt" to modify
their agreement without satisfying their NOM clause, their "attempt"
31. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280,
1286 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co., 390 Pa. 445, 448,
136 A.2d 82, 83-84 (1957)); S & M Rotogravure Service, Inc. v. Baer, 77 Wis. 2d 454,
252 N.W.2d 913, 920 (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 407
comment a (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 283 comment b (1981);
CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1297, and cases cited therein.
33. Section 2-209(2) provides: "A signed agreement which excludes modification
or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded
.... According to the New York Law Revision Commission, the rescission language
prevents the parties from circumventing the section. In its absence, the parties could
orally rescind their agreement, including the NOM clause, and enter a new oral
agreement that alters the original contract. See NEw YORK LAw REvISION COMMIS-
SION, 1 STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Doc. No. 65(c), at 643, 728-29
(1955).
34. See DUSENBERG & KING, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 3 U.C.C. SERV. (MB) § 4.04[1] (1966 and 1987 Supp.); W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-209:01 (1986).
35. This requirement was eliminated in U.C.C. Section 2-209(1), which provides:
"An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be
binding." At common law, a promise to provide additional consideration in return
for a performance the other party was already bound to perform was unenforceable
for lack of consideration. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir.
1902); Hillman, Policing Contracting Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doc-
trine of Economic Duress, 64 IOwA L. REV. 849, 851-852 (1979). This doctrine, known as
the preexisting duty rule, was intended to deter coerced modifications. But the doc-
trine also barred some voluntary modifications unsupported by consideration. As a
result, many disfavored the doctrine, prompting the Code drafters to eliminate it. See
DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 34, at 4.0411]. In place of consideration, the Code
polices coercion through the Section 1-203 requirement of good faith performance.
Hillman, supra, at 852-55.
36. HAWKLAND, supra note 34, at 2-209:03. See generally Fuller, supra notes 8 and 9.
37. See DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 34, at § 4.04[2][a]; HAWxLAND, supra note
34, at 2-209:93.
38. The section provides: "Although an attempt at modification or rescission
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) ... it can operate as a waiver."
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"can operate as a waiver." This curious language presents many diffi-
culties.3 9 For example, the Code fails to define clearly what constitutes
an "attempt at modification" that does not satisfy Section 2-209(2).
Obviously the drafters contemplated something short of a signed writ-
ing, for this would satisfy the section. But an "attempt at modification"
might require an oral agreement, a unilateral relinquishment of a right,
or something else. Moreover, although the Code states that an "attempt
at modification ... can operate as a waiver," it fails to explain when it
does so operate.40 The language of the section suggests that not all
attempts at modification operate as a waiver. Indeed, if all attempts at
modification operated as a waiver, little or nothing would be left of Sec-
tion 2-209(2). Even if we knew what conduct "operates as a waiver," the
Code gives no guidance as to the legal effect of a "waiver" once found.
Did the parties waive the NOM clause? Or did they waive the substan-
tive term they were modifying? Does it matter?4 1
Section 2-209(5) also confuses the legal analysis of NOM clauses. 42
Suppose parties subject to a NOM clause engage in conduct that "can
operate as a waiver" under Section 2-209(4). According to Section 2-
209(5), if the conduct operates as a waiver, a party can retract the waiver
unless retraction would be "unjust" due to "material" reliance. Obvi-
ously, the section raises yet more questions. For example, the Code's
drafters neglected to clarify when retraction of a waiver would be
"unjust." Nor did they define what constitutes "material" reliance. It is
also unclear whether these two standards are meant to be separate
tests. 4
3
There are a host of difficulties here, and courts and commentators
do not speak with one voice about solutions.4 4 For example, one obvi-
39. I will raise here only those issues pertinent to an understanding of CISG arti-
cle 29(2). For a full discussion of the issues arising under § 2-209, see Hillman, supra
note 5.
40. The New York Law Revision Commission, studying the Code for possible
passage in New York, suggested that "attempt at modification" was too narrow. NEW
YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, I STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Doc.
No. 65(c), at 645 (1955).
41. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 368 (arguing that modifications that "operate as a
waiver" waive both the term that is the subject of the modification and the NOM
clause).
42. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) provides:
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract
may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party
that strict performance will be required of the term waived, unless the retrac-
tion would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on
the waiver.
43. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 5, at 373.
44. Commentators' analyses include CORBIN, supra note 9, at 211; Eisler, Oral
Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Statute of Frauds
Problem, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 277, 298-302 (1980); Hillman, supra note 5, at 356-59, 364-
67; Murray, The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32
VILL. L. REV. 1, 28-44 (1987). Court discussions include Wisconsin Knife Works v.
National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986); South Hampton Co. v. Stin-
nes Corp., 733 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1984); Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co.,
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ous solution to the problem of when an oral modification agreement
"operates as a waiver" focuses on reliance. An oral modification agree-
ment "operates as a waiver" when the party urging enforcement of the
oral modification relies on it.4 5 This approach drastically diminishes the
legal effect of NOM clauses.
Another analysis, elsewhere proposed by this author,46 would pre-
serve both NOM clauses and the possibility of good faith oral modifica-
tions. This approach focuses on the meaning of the term "waiver." A
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right.4 7 Therefore, a plausible
distinction could be drawn between oral alterations of existing contrac-
tual terms and oral additions of entirely new ones. An oral modification
would "operate as a waiver" only when it deletes or changes existing
terms not when it seeks to add entirely new terms.
For example, if parties orally agreed to adjust their date of delivery,
Section 2-209(4) would enforce the alteration. Consistent with Section
2-209(5), such a modification could be retracted unless the party urging
enforcement of the oral agreement reasonably and materially relied on
it.48 However, if the parties orally agreed to add a new term, such as an
arbitration provision, the NOM clause would bar enforcement of the
423 So. 2d 966 (Fla. App. 1982); Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George W.
Rodgers Construction Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Gold Kist, Inc. v.
Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. App. 1979).
45. See, e.g., Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966 (Fla. App.
1982); Rose v. Spa Realty Associates, 42 N.Y.2d 338, 397 N.Y.S.2d 922, 366 N.E.2d
1279 (1979); Gold Kist v. Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. App. 1979); CORBIN, supra
note 9, at 210-12; FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at 476-77 (1982); Eisler, supra note 44,
at 298-302.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the reliance-based analy-
sis. In Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir.
1986), the plaintiff-buyer, Wisconsin Knife Works, entered into a contract with the
defendant-seller, National Metal Crafters, for the purchase of spade bits. The con-
tract contained a NOM clause and called for delivery of the bits by the fall of 1981.
The seller failed to meet the delivery deadlines, but instead of cancelling the contract
or suing for breach, the buyer accepted partial delivery of the spade bits. Onjanuary
13, 1983, however, the buyer terminated the contract and sued the seller for failing
to honor the original delivery terms. A jury found that the buyer had modified the
contract by accepting partial delivery.
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that an attempt at modifi-
cation operates as a waiver "only if there is reliance." Id. at 1287. The court
remanded the case for a finding of whether the seller had relied on the buyer's con-
duct. The court believed that the evidence did not preclude the possibility that the
seller would have continued to produce the bits even if the buyer had terminated in
the fall of 1981.
Judge Easterbrook dissented, insisting that reliance was not an essential element of
waiver under Section 2-209(4): "Under Section 2-209(4) a waiver may be effective;
under section 2-209(5) a waiver may be effective prospectively only if there was detri-
mental reliance." Id. at 1291. Judge Easterbrook therefore believed that the buyer's
waiver, found by the jury, excused the seller's performance until January 1983,
regardless of the seller's reliance.
46. See Hillman, supra note 5.
47. Id. at 366.
48. U.C.C. § 2-209(5).
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provision with or without reliance on it.4 9
This approach limits the bite of Section 2-209(2) but preserves a
role for a NOM clause. Modifications that add new or additional terms
to contracts are unusual5 ° and potentially cause greater disruption than
modifications that alter existing terms. Enforcing a writing requirement
in the former cases would be consistent with a NOM clause's purposes
of avoiding fraud and cautioning the parties. The approach is therefore
a plausible compromise for lawmakers ambivalent about the appropriate
role for a NOM clause. 5 1
Others suggest additional possible interpretations of Section 2-
209.52 The number and complexity of the "solutions" to the Section 2-
209 quandary testify to the section's inadequacies. Whether one
approves of the approaches described above or favors another, the main
point is that the U.C.C. drafters did not do an exemplary job. Did the
drafters of the Convention do better?
I. Article 29(2) Of The Convention
Part III first considers the Convention's overarching principles and poli-
cies, which illuminate its approach to NOM clauses. 55 The Part then
analyzes article 29(2), which codifies the Convention's NOM clauses
solution.
A. Principles and Policies Underlying the Convention
The Convention's foundation is freedom of contract. 5 4 Under article 6,
49. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 366.
50. Id. at 366-67 (most of the reported cases involve adjusting the time for per-
formance). I suggest the distinction between modifying existing terms and adding
new ones because it helps resolve issues of Code interpretation. If I could wipe the
slate clean, I would not favor such an approach. See Part IV. A better approach, if
compromise is necessary, is to determine whether the parties were accustomed to the
particular type of adjustment and whether they bargained over it. The substance of
the modification is some evidence on these points but is not dispositive. See infra
notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
51. The majority in Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d
1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1986), did not accept the distinction between waiving or modify-
ing an existing term and adding a new term, describing it as a "conceivable but unsat-
isfactory" solution. Id. at 1286. They argued that the distinction "would take care of
a case such as Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902)), where
seamen attempted to enforce a contract modification that raised their wages; but
would not take care of the functionally identical case where seamen sought to collect
the agreed-on wages without doing the agreed-on work." I would assert that both
examples are "attempts at modification" that can operate as waivers. Both involve a
modification of an existing term-the wages provision and the term enumerating the
duties of the seamen, respectively-not a modification to tack on a new term such as a
requirement that Alaska Packers' sell the seamen a share of the company.
52. See supra note 44.
53. Article 7(2) states in part that "[q]uestions concerning matters governed by
this Convention which are not expressly settled in it, are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles upon which it is based ......
54. See C. BIANCA & M. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 52 (1987) [hereinafter BIANCA & BONELL]; J.
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"[t]he parties may exclude the application of the Convention... or der-
ogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." The Convention
does not govern consumer transactions, 5 5 nor does it apply to the valid-
ity of contracts between merchants. 5 6 It therefore should not be sur-
prising that its provisions are not mandatory.
The Convention also aims to facilitate international transactions.
Because speed and informality characterize these transactions, 57 the
drafters generally discarded formal requirements such as the statute of
frauds. 58 As with the U.C.C.,5 9 the Convention also eradicates the
requirement of consideration to support a modification or termination
of a contract.60
A third general principle of the CISG is the promotion of uniform
application. 61 The Convention originated from the need for a harmoni-
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 105 (1982); LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1980), 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, Sept. 21, 1983, at 3 [hereinafter cited as LEGAL ANALY-
SIS]. According to Professor Winship, article 6 of the Convention "embodies a vigor-
ous affirmation of the principle of party autonomy." P. WINSHIP, THE SCOPE OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS, PARKER SCHOOL, INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 1.02, at 1-33 (1984) (Chapter 1).
55. See article 2(a).
56. Under article 4, the Convention "is not concerned with ... the validity of the
contract or any of its provisions." "Validity" deals with questions of mistake, duress,
fraud, illegality, and unconscionability. See Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265,
280 (1984). Because such doctrines represent deeply held norms ofjustice and fair-
ness they are mandatory in most legal systems. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54,
at 84.
57. See HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 155.
58. Article 11 abolishes any writing requirement. "Formal requirements have
generated litigation and uncertainty and are generally regarded to be of doubtful
value for international trade." LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 54, at 5. See also Honnold,
The New Uniform Law for International Sales and the UCC: A Comparison, 18 INT'L LAw 21,
26 (1984). Many of the countries adopting the Convention have discarded their stat-
ute of frauds. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 152.
Article 11 does not apply, however, when a party maintains its place of business in
a state which has made a declaration under article 96 that article 11 does not apply.
Article 12 is to the same effect. See HONNOLD, id. at 155. The drafters included arti-
cles 12 and 96 to mollify the Soviet Union, which insisted that abolition of a writing
requirement was inconsistent with its commercial practices. Id. Articles 12 and 96
are therefore exceptions to the general principle of article 11.
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
60. Article 29(1) states that "(a) contract may be modified or terminated by the
mere agreement of the parties."
61. Article 7(1) states:
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its interna-
tional character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade.
The Convention resembles a "true code"--"a preemptive systematic, and compre-
hensive enactment of a whole field of law." Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"
Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 292. Under a "true Code" approach to interpreta-
tion, a court should look to the Convention itself for solutions, not to judicial con-
struction, even when there is no express language on point. Principles and policies
fill the gaps. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: U.C.C. Section 1-103
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ous set of rules to support worldwide commerce. 62 Achieving the requi-
site uniformity may be the Convention's greatest challenge. Its text is
the product of agreement among diverse states with widely differing sys-
tems. Participants in the Convention included countries with both com-
mon law and civil law traditions, capitalist and socialist philosophies,
and immense and paltry wealth. 63 As Professor Rosett has suggested,
the monumental task of legal harmonization among such diverse polit-
ical systems required numerous compromises. 64 Unfortunately, such
compromises seriously undermine the precision and certainty essential
to a successful legal code.6 5
Finally, the CISG includes a reference to good faith.66 Although
this standard has analogues in many domestic legal systems,6 7 including
the U.C.C.,6 8 the CISG's good faith provision created much contro-
versy.6 9 Many delegates felt that "good faith" was too vague.70 A pro-
vision on good faith was ultimately included, but only as a supplement
to the interpretation of the Convention, rather than as an affirmative
obligation of the parties to a contract. 7 1
B. Article 29(2)'s Treatment of NOM Clauses
The Convention deals with NOM clauses in article 29(2). The article
provides:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modifica-
tion or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise
modified or terminated by agreement. However, a party may be pre-
cluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that
and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 655, 657 (1977). See also
Rosett, supra note 56, at 297-98. Indeed, article 7(2) specifically directs courts to
internal principles when a matter "is not expressly settled."
62. Rosett, supra note 56, at 266-67.
63. Id. at 268, 270.
64. See Rosett, supra note 56. Professor Rosett asserts that, in an effort to secure
agreement among the delegates, the drafters often masked unresolved differences
through vague and general language. Various provisions of the Convention "do not
reflect two parties having yielded part of their positions to each other for the sake of
agreement, but rather two sides agreeing to give the appearance of agreement by a
verbal formula which does not provide meaningful guidance in concrete situations."
Id. at 282.
65. See generally Hillman, supra note 61, at 710 n.310.
66. Article 7(1) provides that "[i]n the interpretation of this convention, regard is
to be had to... the observance of good faith in international trade."
67. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at 85-86; HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 124,
and sources cited therein.
68. U.C.C. § 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
69. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at 85-86; HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 123;
Rosett, supra, note 56, at 289-90.
70. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at 85-86; HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 123.
71. See HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 124; but see BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at
85. Professor Bonell argues that the obligation of good faith may apply directly to
the parties.
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the other party has relied on that conduct.7 2
As with Section 2-209 of the U.C.C., the Convention first recognizes
NOM clauses and then diminishes them, 73 but article 29(2) at least
avoids some of the curious language of Section 2-209. Instead of the
confusing reference to an "attempt at modification" that may preclude
enforcement of a NOM clause, we have "conduct" of a party that may do
the same. Instead of the U.C.C.'s ambiguity regarding when an attempt
at modification "operates as a waiver," concerning the meaning and
legal effect of a waiver once found, and about the opportunity for retrac-
tion of the waiver, article 29(2) provides simply that reliance on a
party's conduct may preclude that party from asserting a NOM clause.
In terms of brevity and simplicity, article 29(2)'s treatment of NOM
clauses is a colossal improvement over the Code's. However, in view of
the inconclusive debate concerning NOM clauses, a simple, clear com-
promise may be impossible.
Article 29(2) raises serious questions as to its scope and applica-
tion.74 For example, what are the properjudicial responses to the "con-
duct" and "reliance" tests of the article? Presumably, the Convention's
72. An earlier version of article 29(2) more closely resembled Section 2-209 of
the U.C.C. Article 3A provided:
(1) An agreement by the parties made in good faith to modify or rescind
the contract is effective. However, a written contract which excludes any
modification or rescission unless in writing cannot be otherwise modified or
rescinded.
(2) Action by one party on which the other party reasonably relies to his
detriment may constitute a waiver of a provision in a contract which requires
any modification or rescission to be in writing. A party who has waived a
provision relating to any unperformed portion of the contract may retract the
waiver. However, a waiver cannot be retracted if the retraction would result
in unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense to the other party
because of his reliance on the waiver.
Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Eighth
Session, A/CN.9/128, para. 36. Because some believed that this version was too com-
plex and unclear, a "working group" consisting of representatives from Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland sub-
stantially composed the final text. Id. at 77, para. 43-45. Despite the changes, the
final version also "resembles" U.C.C. Section 2-209. See HONNOLD, supra note 54, at
231.
73. The present structure of article 29 represents a compromise between the pro
and anti-NOM clause factions in the working group. Those favoring NOM clauses
argued that parties wishing to preserve an "adequate paper record" of their dealings
should be able to do so. Those opposed contended that barring enforcement of oral
modifications on the basis of a NOM clause would be unfair. The present structure
was retained on the grounds of "balance." See Report of the Working Group on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Ninth Session, A/CN.9/142, reprinted in IX Y.B.
UNCITRAL 72.
The termination language in article 29(2) replaces the rescission terminology in
Section 2-209, and, presumably, serves the same purpose. See supra note 33.
74. Professor Date-Bah contends that article 29(2) provides a "flexible framework
within which to reach fair results when one party's behavior is such that it would be
unfair to allow him to insist on the requirement of a writing." BIANCA & BONELL,
supra note 54, at 243. Not one but two references to fairness in this explanation
suggests how open-ended this article is. Professor Rosett argues that the goal of the
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open-ended reference to "conduct" is at least as broad as the "attempt
at modification" language of the U.C.C. 75 Might the test even be
broader? Does article 29(2) mean that any behavior that lulls a party
into believing that a written adjustment is unnecessary overrides a NOM
clause?
Similarly, although Section 2-209(5)'s "material change of posi-
tion" test offers at least some guidance as to when a court may bar a
retraction of a waiver and thereby enforce a NOM clause, 7 6 article 29(2)
is devoid of such tests. This raises a number of questions. Must reliance
be foreseeable? 77 If so, measured by what standard? Must reliance be
reasonable? 78 If so, is reliance on an oral agreement modifying a con-
tract ever reasonable when the contract contains a NOM clause?79
The Convention's general principles do not help very much in
resolving these questions. In fact, they simply require the interpreter to
revisit the issues discussed, but not resolved, in this paper.80 What
approach to NOM clauses best advances freedom of contract? What
approach facilitates commerce? What approach promotes uniformity?
Courts seeking a model to resolve NOM clause issues could look to
analogous law developed in various states. For example, the law of
promissory estoppel in the United States suggests a test of reliance. A
promisor is bound to a promise when the promisee's reliance is substan-
tial and reasonably foreseeable. 8 ' Even reliance on a revocable offer
drafters was to avoid offending any of the participants. The result was often a high
level of abstraction. Rosett, supra note 56, at 286.
75. Article 29(2)'s apparent breadth is, of course, hardly surprising in light of the
Convention's low regard for formal writing requirements. See supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
76. The Section invokes the tests of "materiality" and "injustice." See supra notes
42-43 and accompanying text.
77. Other articles, considering other problems, expressly employ the foreseeabil-
ity test. See, e.g., art. 25.
78. Other articles, dealing with other problems, expressly so require. See, e.g., art.
15(3).
79. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Professor Honnold sets forth an
application of article 29(2):
A written contract called for Seller to manufacture 10,000 units of a prod-
uct according to specifications that were supplied by Buyer and set forth in
the contract. The contract provided: 'This contract may only be modified by
a writing signed by the parties.' Before Seller started production, the parties
by telephone agreed on a change in the specifications. Seller produces 2,000
units in accordance with the new specifications; Buyer refused to accept these
units on the ground that they did not conform to the specification in the
written contract.
HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 231. He suggests that Buyer could insist on the original
specifications only for production after the 2,000 units. But was Seller's reliance on
the telephone call reasonable? Is reasonable reliance required? See infra notes 104-
05 and accompanying text.
80. See supra Parts I and II.
81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1981); James King &
Son, Inc. v. De Santis Construction, No. 2 Corp., 92 Misc. 2d 1063, 413 N.Y.S.2d 78
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Blackwell v. Int. Union, 9 Ohio App. 3d 179, 458 N.E.2d 1272
(1983).
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may be reasonably foreseeable and therefore bar revocation of the
offer.8 2 Under this approach, when reliance on an oral modification is
substantial and reasonably foreseeable, article 29(2) would bar enforce-
ment of a NOM clause.8 3 On the other hand, article 29(2) may demand
a narrower interpretation of reliance. Otherwise a NOM clause,
although recognized by article 29(2), would have little function.8 4 In
addition, following a particular state's approach to reliance runs the
danger of undermining uniformity of interpretation.8 5
In the end, a proper interpretation of "conduct" and "reliance"
may depend on one's view of the value of NOM clauses. Broad interpre-
tations swallow up NOM clauses, while restrictive ones preserve them.
Another imbroglio involving the Convention's treatment of NOM
clauses concerns the relationship between article 6 and article 29(2).
Article 6 entitles the parties to substitute their contract's own law for
"any" provision of the Convention. 86 Suppose the parties include a
NOM clause that states that "no modification of this contract shall be
binding unless in writing." Have these parties, in the language of article
6, "derogat[ed] from or var[ied] the effect" of a "provision" of the Con-
vention, namely article 29(2)'s reliance exception to the enforceability of
a NOM clause?8 7
The express language of the NOM clause certainly suggests that the
parties intended to bar enforcement of oral modifications completely.
On the other hand, a court might conclude that the NOM clause was
unclear because it did not specifically refer to article 29(2) or to the
effect of reliance on an oral modification. However, article 6 does not
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981). See also R. HILLMAN, J.
McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EOUITY UNDER THE U.C.C. 2.03[3][b]
(1985).
83. This interpretation is consistent with the promotion of good faith in interna-
tional trade. When reliance on an oral modification is reasonably foreseeable, a
party's rigorous insistence on enforcement of a NOM clause would be in bad faith.
84. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Under whatever views of "con-
duct" and "reliance" courts ultimately coalesce, a NOM proponent will still be enti-
tled to reinstate its rights prospectively by clear notice to the other party. In such a
situation, there would no longer be any conduct on which to rely and, hence, no
longer any reasonable reliance. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at 243; HON-
NOLD, supra note 54, at 231.
85. Unlike the Code, the Convention is not a "common law" code anticipating
case construction. According to Professor Rosett "most of the participants in the
Convention have legal systems that do not accord court decisions the dispositive
authority which they possess in the common-law system." Rosett, supra note 56, at
272. Because most participating states do not have well-developed systems for
reporting decisions, it also may be quite difficult for ajudge to learn how other states
apply the Convention. Id. at 299.
86. Article 6 is set forth and discussed at text accompanying notes 54-56.
87. Professor Honnold states that "the Convention's gamut of provisions on the
obligations of seller and buyer and the remedies for breach (Part III) [of which article
29(2) is a part] may be reshaped by the agreement." HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 105.
He also states that article 6 authorizes the parties to "broaden the scope" of article
29(2). Id. at 230.
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require an express exclusion or derogation.8 8 Instead, the Convention
directs courts to determine the parties' implicit intentions in light of the
circumstances.8 9 Because it taxes the imagination to envision parties'
bargaining to include a clause barring oral modification only in the
absence of reliance, presumably the court would decide that the parties
intended to bar all oral modifications.
The Convention does not expressly preclude parties from "dero-
gat[ing] from" article 29(2)'s reliance exception. In fact, the Conven-
tion bars enforcement of the reliance exception when a state makes a
declaration under articles 12 and 96 that all contracts and modifications
must be in writing. 90 One could assert that the Convention, in light of
its emphasis on freedom of contract, confers the same right on the par-
ties. Although the Convention generally quashes formal requirements,
the goal was to eliminate such requirements supplied by law, not those
supplied by the parties themselves. 9 '
Despite the Convention's silence, however, the better interpretation
probably is that the parties cannot derogate from the reliance exception
of article 29(2). Article 29(2) is itself a limitation on the parties' article 6
freedom of contract; otherwise, article 6 completely subverts article
29(2)'s reliance exception. Presumably the drafters intended a role for
the latter provision.
The appropriate resolution of the issues raised under article 29(2)
is not self-evident. As with the U.C.C., this is not surprising in view of
the general ambivalence about NOM clauses, the absence of empirical
evidence on the effects of the enforcement of NOM clauses, and the lack
of any particular theoretical insight on the issues raised by these
clauses. 92 Can drafters avoid the questions the U.C.C. and the CISG
present with regard to NOM clauses? What should we tell the next
88. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 54, at 55; HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 106.
89. Article 8 contains the convention rules governing the interpretation of the
intent of the parties. It provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had
in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reason-
able person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent con-
duct of the parties.
Professor Rosett criticizes article 8 for including both subjective and objective tests
and not clearly guiding their usage. Rosett, supra note 56, at 288.
90. See supra note 58.
91. Article 11 of the Convention does not preclude parties from imposing formal
requirements such as a NOM clause. HONNOLD, supra note 54, at 153. Such formal
requirements therefore should be distinguished from formal requirements imposed
by operation of law.
92. See generally Rosett, supra note 56, at 285.
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group of drafters facing the NOM clause controversy? These questions
are the subject of Part IV.
IV. NOM Clauses In Sales Law
The NOM clause issues raised by the CISG and the U.C.C. derive from a
fundamental ambivalence about the wisdom of enforcing such provi-
sions. Under the CISG, the appropriate approach to "conduct" and
"reliance," and the relationship between articles 6 and 29(2), depend on
the extent to which we want to enforce NOM clauses. A suitable inter-
pretation of U.C.C. Section 2-209 involves similar considerations.
Tackling the difficult philosophical, conceptual, and empirical ques-
tions presented9 3 may help resolve the NOM clause question, but I am
not optimistic. The command of freedom of contract in this context
remains elusive, as does the meaning of reasonable reliance. Empirical
evidence about the parties' actual practices will be costly and likely
indeterminate. 94
Perhaps future drafters should abandon compromise, which inevi-
tably generates confusion. Instead, they should swallow hard and then
decide simply to enforce NOM clauses or to abolish them. Either
approach would be certain, simple, and would thus promote uniform
interpretation. Either approach might therefore be superior to the
U.C.C. or the Convention. 95
Given a choice between enforcing NOM clauses and abolishing
them, I would favor the latter, at least if the debate took place in the
United States. My reasons are practical ones. All other things being
equal (or equally unknown), perhaps the law should respect the latest
bargain or position of the parties. This approach accords with the com-
mon law ban on NOM clauses, 96 which hardly wreaked havoc on com-
mercial transactions in this country. Given the doubt concerning NOM
clauses, we should preserve the status quo ante. In addition, abolishing
NOM clauses is consistent with the momentum of contract law in the
United States to protect the reliance interest. 9 7 Finally, enforcing the
parties' most recent agreement or position has intuitive, if not reasoned,
appeal. 98
93. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
94. See supra Part I.
95. See supra Parts II and III.
96. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ.
52 (1936); Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independmt
Theory of Recovery, 35 RuTrGERS L. REV. 472 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTs § 90 (1981). Some criticize judicial application of promissory estoppel. See,
e.g., Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV. 678 (1984).
Others, however, reject the view that reliance is the core of promissory estoppel
cases. See Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshahe," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985).
98. One could construct an argument based on good faith in support of this posi-
tion. It would be dishonest for a party to use a NOM clause as a shield after that
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How should those bent upon compromise approach NOM clauses?
Although compromise will inevitably generate some confusion and
uncertainty, the confusion would be significantly reduced by an
approach to NOM clauses that focuses on and compares the nature of
the parties' assent to the NOM clause and to the subsequent oral
modification.
Suppose, for example, that the parties typically bargained very
informally, were generally unconcerned about the contents of their
written contract, and were either unaware of the inclusion of a NOM
clause or ignorant of its effect. 99 In short, the NOM clause was not a
"dickered" term.10 0 In addition, suppose that the parties valued their
flexibility, often modified their agreements orally, carefully ironed out
their oral modification and were comfortable with their subject mat-
ter. 10 Obviously, these parties would be surprised to learn that their
modification agreement was unenforceable. Under these circumstances,
the principle of freedom of contract strongly suggests enforcing an oral
modification despite the NOM clause.' 0 2
Conversely, assume that the parties carefully bargained over their
initial contract, including the NOM clause. Suppose further that it was
highly unusual for the parties to adjust their agreement orally. If the
parties nevertheless precipitously modified their contract orally, a court
probably should enforce the NOM clause.' 0 3 The parties sought pro-
tection in their NOM clause from just such situations.
party has agreed to an oral modification. Conversely, an equally compelling argu-
ment could be made against the party who seeks to enforce the oral modification
notwithstanding a NOM clause, thus circumventing the "law" of the contract.
99. Or suppose the NOM clause was contained in one party's form in the context
of what is referred to in the United States as a "battle of the forms." See WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 24-39. In such a transaction, the parties exchange their
purchase order and acknowledgment forms through the mail and begin to perform
the contract, often ignorant of the precise terms on the forms, which often conflict.
100. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-371 (1960).
101. Under both the U.C.C. and the CISG, in fact, the parties may be bound to any
practice of oral adjustment. See U.C.C. § 1-205; Convention art. 9.
102. See supra note 10.
103. This general approach was suggested, but ultimately rejected, by the drafters
of the CISG. In the deliberations on article 29(2)'s recognition of a NOM clause, the
delegate from Italy had the "battle of the forms," see supra note 99, or a similar
problem in mind when he suggested a basically assent-based approach to NOM
clauses. He argued that "when the requirement of written... modification had not
been specifically accepted by the parties to a contract, but had merely been included
in the general conditions drawn up unilaterally by one of them," an oral modification
should be enforceable. Com. I (art. 27), SR. 13 para. 56 (1980). The delegate from
Bulgaria opposed this suggestion on the theory that "(t)he parties to commercial
contracts usually enjoyed equal bargaining power and did not need the defence
offered by the amendment." The latter reasoning prevailed. Id. at paras. 57-60.
The Uniform Commercial Code hints at an assent-based approach to NOM clauses
in Section 2-209(2)'s requirement that such clauses be separately signed. However,
this requirement applies only when a merchant supplies the form to a consumer.
Hillman, supra note 5, at 357-58.
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Focusing on assent helps resolve fairness questions raised by the
enforcement of a NOM clause after a party has relied on an oral modifi-
cation. ' 0 4 In the context of an informal, flexible relation, reliance on an
oral adjustment may well be reasonable even when the written contract
contains a boiler-plate NOM clause. Ignoring such reliance would be
unfair. On the other hand, reliance on an ill-conceived, hurried, oral
modification of a meticulously bargained contract containing a promi-
nent NOM clause may be unreasonable. Enforcement of a NOM clause
in such circumstances would not be unfair.105
An assent-based analysis is also consistent with utilitarian consider-
ations.10 6 Even if the parties had adequate information to assess the
costs and benefits of a NOM clause, 10 7 the inclusion of such a clause is
consistent with the parties' best interests only when they knew of its
inclusion and understood its legal effect. in addition, a carefully bar-
gained oral modification cautions the parties and, in most instances,
should provide ample evidence of its existence.
Still, I harbor no illusions that an assent-based inquiry would offer
certainty and simplicity. The test requires courts to sift through poten-
tially conflicting evidence concerning the parties' bargaining and other
conduct at two different stages of their transaction. Nevertheless, for
those who insist on a compromise position on NOM clauses, an assent-
based test would solve several important problems while appropriately
focusing the inquiry on the issues that underlie the NOM clause
controversy. 108
How should the drafters, seeking a compromise position on NOM
clauses, resolve a "hard" case, in which the focus on assent does not
compel a particular result? Suppose, for example, that the parties care-
fully bargained over their NOM clause and their oral modification.10 9
104. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
105. But I would not require proof of actual reliance in a new framework.
Although reliance will almost always exist, it may be hard to prove and rebut. For
example, reliance may consist of forgoing some other opportunity. See Fuller & Per-
due, supra note 97.
106. See supra notes 8-9, 11-12, 19-24 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
108. A new NOM clause rule would state:
Enforcement of a clause precluding oral modification or termination
depends on the parties intentions as determined by the overall circum-
stances. Relevant circumstances include the purpose of the parties' written
contract, any custom concerning the use of NOM clauses, the parties' course
of dealing on NOM clauses, whether the parties specifically considered the
NOM clause, whether they understood its effect, any custom involving the
procedure for modifying written contracts, the parties' course of dealing on
modification, the purpose of the modification, and the nature of the bargain-
ing of the modification.
109. For example, in a large corporation, the persons with authority to modify a
contract might not be those who negotiated the contract. An engineer may want to
change the specifications of an order or a company's sales representative or purchas-
ing agent may want to alter the delivery date or the size of an order. These persons
may act in good faith in ignorance of the fact that others bargained over a NOM
clause.
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For reasons already mentioned-the conflicting or unclear messages of
principles of autonomy, fairness, and utility, 11 0 and the practical gui-
dance of history, analogous law, and even intuition' I'-I favor the par-
ties' final oral bargain in such a hard case.
Conclusion
The Convention's treatment of NOM clauses is superior to the U.C.C's.
Nevertheless, I predict article 29(2) will also generate some confusion
and controversy. The next group of drafters considering NOM clauses
should simply abolish them. For those insisting on a compromise posi-
tion, a contextual analysis comparing the initial bargain with the subse-
quent oral modification may well prove a fruitful alternative
methodology.
110. See supra Part I.
111. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
